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Logical Nihilism Suggests Evidential Nihilism 
Abstract: Logical nihilism is the view that all claims of the form A logically entails B are 
false. I argue that if this is true its consequences (if you will excuse the pun) cannot be 
limited just to philosophical logic, but it would undermine all presently accepted analyses 
of evidence. I.e. if logical nihilism is true it suggests that evidential nihilism is true, noth-
ing is evidence for any hypothesis. I end by suggesting that this suggestion may be wel-
comed as part of a reappraisal of the task of epistemology, if logical nihilism is accepted. 
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The role and status of logic in our cognitive lives is a matter of the first importance for 
philosophy. Judging by our own pedagogical habits we seem to agree that it is the organon 
of our field, as it is one of few near universally taught tools we impart to students. And in 
any case our theories of logic, and especially logical consequence, encode what may be 
our most primitive or bedrock epistemological principles. If we cannot rely on the truth 
preserving inferences encoded in a consequence relationship, where can we even begin in 
our inquiries? 
Logical nihilism has recently been defended by Gillian Russell (2017a, 2018). Logical ni-
hilism is the view that, for any sentences or propositions A, B, it is not the case that A ⊨ B, 
where ⊨ is read as denoting logical entailment. (Note: the thesis is taken to hold also for 
propositions, thoughts, or any other entities purported to stand in logical entailment rela-
tionships with each other.) In this brief note I shall not be exploring the reasons for this 
view, but suffice it to say that the claim is roughly that for Γ ⊨ B to hold there has to be 
an exceptionless logical law that where every sentence in Γ is true then so too is B – but in 
fact no such exceptionless laws exist, and hence for all Γ and B it is not the case that 
Γ⊨ B. For an explanation and discussion of this argument see (Wyatt & Gillman 2021). As 
might be expected from the centrality of logic in our lives, I will suggest that if logical ni-
hilism is granted then a quite thorough rethinking of corer epistemic notions would be re-
quired. 
The central conceit of this paper turns upon the following argument schema. Let X denote 
a theory of evidence. Examples of this sort of theory will be given below, but broadly this 
is a theory which specifies what relationship propositions (or theories, or sentences, or…) 
have to stand in such that one can be evidence for the other. The argument schema I am 
concerned with is: 
1. Logical nihilism is true. 
2. If X is true, then if there is any E, T, such that E is evidence for T then there are 
some A, B, such that A ⊨ B. 
3. Hence if X is true there are no E,T, such that E is evidence for T.  
I.e. if logical nihilism is true, then according to many theories of evidence there is no evi-
dence. Note (2) does not require that evidence itself be propositional or stand in deduc-
tive relationships, all it requires is that where evidence for a theory exists some claims 
must be logically deducible. Nor does this argument rely on the contentious claim that 
logic is itself epistemically normative (e.g. Field 2015 vs Russell 2017b). Folk who are not 
logical nihilists, at least, should be able to recognise this as a semantically valid argument 
schema. The question is whether there is any X that would make (2) true. 
Theories of Evidence 
Most theories of evidence are at least one of probabilistic, contrastive, or explanatory. 
Probabilistic theories analyse “E is evidence for T” as meaning some appropriately speci-
fied probabilistic relationship holds between E and T. Contrastive theories hold that “E is 
evidence for T” is true just in case E rules out or renders less likely some set of salient al-
ternative theories to T. And explanatory theories hold that “E is evidence for T” is true 
when E, having been observed, is appropriately explained by T. Theories of evidence with-
in these classes tend to make schema (2) true. 
Think, for instance, of probabilistic theories, the family of theories of evidence wherein 
one E is evidence for T relative to background knowledge K iff P(T|E&K) > P(T|K) – that is, 
E raises the probability of T relative to K (Climenhaga 2017a, 71). But note that P(T|E&K) 
> P(T|K) is true only if  ⊨ P(T|E&K) > P(T|K). Or, perhaps, letting Γ be a description of the 
space and the distribution of priors, then Γ ⊨ P(T|E&K) > P(T|K).   This is for the simple 
reason that probability theory is a mathematical theory like any other, dependent upon 
establishing theorems relating propositions of interest. And to say of a claim that it is a 
mathematical theorem is simply to say that it admits of a sound deductive proof from ac-
cepted mathematical claims, which is to say it is a logical consequence of some premises 
of interest. Letting Δ include both whatever axioms one works from and Γ, then at the 
least, therefore, Δ  ⊨ P(T|E&K) > P(T|K). If this latter did not hold then one has not in 
fact established the probabilistic claim one purports to base one’s evidential analysis 
upon. The result of any such modification in the present case would be that the “probabil-
ity” used in stating the claim about evidence would no longer be that of mathematical 
probability theory. But many of the defences of “probability” playing something like this 
role in the theory of evidence depend upon it having the features of mathematical probab-
ility (e.g. Pettigrew 2016 — see also Christensen 2004). 
But even if one wished to reject this general claim about the relationships of mathematic-
al theorems to logical consequence, there are reasons peculiar to probability theory itself 
that suggest logical consequence relationships must hold for it to do its intended work. 
Suppose, to the contrary, that one wanted to allow that P(T|E&K) > P(T|K) can be true 
even if it is false that  ⊨ P(T|E&K) > P(T|K). After all, presumably the logical nihilist still 
wants to allow that some claims are true despite the fact that typically A is true only if A ⊨ 
A. Might not this case be analogous? No. It is not just incidental that probability theory 
relies on mathematical theorems - rather, that probability theory has desirable properties 
for a theory of evidence often itself relies on particular entailment claims holding. For in-
stance, if A ⊨ B, then P(B|A) = 1, which implies that logically equivalent propositions have 
and give the same probabilities. Proofs of probabilistic theorems then standardly rely on 
this and the assumption that two propositions are logically equivalent. You can’t derive 
that P(A) = P(A&B) + P(A&~B), for example, unless you assume that A is logically equival-
ent to (A&B)v(A&~B). However the logical nihilist may go about disentangling other claims 
from their purported inferential roles, in the case of probabilistic theories of evidence this 
could only be done at the cost of cutting away the grounds for thinking them good eviden-
tial theories in the first place. 
Very similar arguments go for contrastive and explanatory theories of evidence. Suppose 
evidence is that which renders one theory the best of a bunch by telling against contextu-
ally salient rival theories. Very often the act of “telling against” a theory is either cashed 
out in probabilistic terms, in which case the above consideration applies. Or where it is 
not it is just directly phrased in terms of simply being logically inconsistent with the other 
theories (e.g. Williamson 1997, 727). Logical inconsistency is typically defined or under-
stood in tandem with claims about negations or incompatible propositions being entailed 
(Restall 2015, Kürbis §4.2). Hence schema (2) would have to hold. Finally, consider theor-
ies of evidence that tie a proposition’s evidential status to its ability to explain some per-
tinent data (Climenhaga 2017b). These theories rely on notions of explanatory relevance, 
the sense in which T bears on E as a potential explanation thereof (Lundberg 2021, 561). 
To flesh this out theories of explanation often either involve probabilistic relationships 
holding at some point, or some other deductive entailment relationship holding among 
claims (Woodward 2014). These theories of evidence will hence often, when fully spelled 
out, satisfy premise (2). 
And just as with probability theory it shall more be difficult to disentangle theories of evi-
dence from claims that logical nihilists are bound to reject. It is not just a quirk of proba-
bilistic theories of evidence that their argumentative support will be eroded by the modi-
fications required to render it compatible with logical nihilism. The same goes for any ex-
planatory theory of evidence that relies on probabilistic or deductive relationships to ex-
plain the connection of evidential relevance. Similar argumentation can be given for evi-
dential theories that stress its contrastive role. It is not an incidental feature of theories 
of incompatibility that they appeal to entailment relationships at some point. These logi-
cal relations were supposed to explain why it was that E being incompatible with T’s con-
textually salient rivals boosted our confidence in T. The logical incompatibility, bound up 
as it is with our notions of logical consequence, was supposed to be what made the theory 
work. Without being able to rely on pertinent entailments it is not clear what the key con-
trast consists in. In all these theories the fact that some deductive relationship holds be-
tween some claims is important to their own justificatory story. 
To summarise, logical nihilism interferes with our theories of evidence in two ways. First, 
for some theories of evidence they just directly analyse evidential relations in terms which 
require logical consequence relations to hold. For instance if I say that E is evidence for T 
just in case it entails a contradiction if combined with salient rival theories to T. Second, 
for some of evidential theories, the justification for the relationship analysed being 
viewed as an evidential relationship in particular requires a theorem to hold. It is the im-
possibility of claims which entail contradictions being simultaneously true which explains 
why we can treat E as evidence for T in the contrastive vase. Logical nihilism thus suggests 
evidential nihilism, and by its own lights it could do no stronger.  
A Sceptical Sketch 
I have not addressed whether this should be viewed as a reductio of logical nihilism.  For 
what it is worth, I do not think it is. Most conservatively, one could see the above as a call 
for those sympathetic to logical nihilism to develop a theory of restricted domains wherein 
consequence relationships are truth tracking. As Russell notes, logical nihilists can agree 
that instances of an inferential schema happen to be truth conducive even while it is not 
everywhere valid (Russell 2017a, 126). A logical nihilist with a theory of evidence that ap-
parently satisfies (2) may thus want to argue that in all instances wherein their theory 
needs Γ ⊨ B to hold it is there truth preserving.  
Such a response would no doubt be a challenging and worthy technical project for the log-
ical nihilist looking to recover a traditional theory of evidence. But I fear it would miss out 
on the opportunity provided to engage in deeper reflection. When one countenances logi-
cal nihilism one is invited to consider a quite different way of living our epistemic lives. 
Theories of evidence which satisfy (2), even when they are apparently fallibilist or not too 
demanding, still relied at some point on some exceptionless relationship holding among 
certain propositions. Logical nihilism asks us not to rely on such exceptionless relation-
ships, for they are liable to disappoint us. If we are to take on board the lessons of ni-
hilism we shall have to accustom ourselves to living in a world that can’t be trusted to 
give us anything more than defeasible heuristics.  
Logical nihilism, and from it evidential nihilism, can be seen as the first steps in a pro-
gramme to “humanise epistemology” by embracing a truly thoroughgoing fallibilism (Wire-
du 1995). What has been exposed is that our core concepts relied on something grander 
than what we have any right to from our human scale. Even humble everyday ideas like 
that of evidence turned out to presuppose, when thoroughly examined, exceptionless gen-
eralities of a sort it is not ours to take for granted. Rather than being seen as a reductio 
for the logical nihilist, or a technical challenge to recapture our traditional theories of ev-
idence in a nihilist framework, we might instead see evidential nihilism as an opportunity 
to craft concepts appropriate for a duly humbled inquirer. 
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